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Abstract
Bioethics has become a prominent part of the American landscape. In only a few short decades this
interdisciplinary field permeated academia and the public sphere. Despite the recent scholarly effort to
chronicle its history, there is still quite a bit of controversy surrounding bioethics’ origin and rapid evolution.
Bioethics’ emergence has already been thoroughly examined through the lens of the potential impact of
various events, issues, biomedical and technological developments, and cultural changes. However, there
appears to be a widespread neglect of the influence the first texts had on the field. Specifically, the importance
of Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics deserves much more
consideration than the limited attention it is given in many of the histories of bioethics. This text, more than
any other, gave bioethics the structure it needed to become a recognizable field of inquiry.
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Abstract  
Bioethics has become a prominent part of the American landscape. In only a few short 
decades this interdisciplinary field permeated academia and the public sphere.  Despite the 
recent scholarly effort to chronicle its history, there is still quite a bit of controversy 
surrounding bioethics’ origin and rapid evolution.  Bioethics’ emergence has already been 
thoroughly examined through the lens of the potential impact of various events, issues, 
biomedical and technological developments, and cultural changes.  However, there appears 
to be a widespread neglect of the influence the first texts had on the field.  Specifically, the 
importance of Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
deserves much more consideration than the limited attention it is given in many of the 
histories of bioethics.  This text, more than any other, gave bioethics the structure it needed 
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Few fields have grown as rapidly as bioethics has over the past several decades. 
 What began as a loose, issue-based discourse has evolved into a legitimate field that has 
gained widespread acceptance in both academia and the public sphere.  With the explosive 
growth and increasing institutionalization that bioethics has experienced in such a short 
time frame, many of its founding academics have sought to chronicle its history.  
The story of the origin and evolution of bioethics has been told in many books, 
essays, and lectures.  Most accounts share a common structure.  In general, they tend to 
define the beginning of bioethics in terms of a crucial catalyzing moment and subsequently 
emphasize certain landmark events, advances in biomedical technology, and ethical issues 
that shaped the field thereafter. Despite the considerable amount of attention that has been 
devoted to chronicling its history, there is still widespread disagreement about bioethics’ 
exact origins.  As social scientists Renée Fox and Judith Swazey assert in their own account 
of the emergence of bioethics, Observing Bioethics, the authors of the majority of these 
histories have been, and still are, “deeply involved in the field.”1  Since each author is 
documenting and analyzing events not as an outside observer, but as a historical actor, 
their personal experience and contributions to the field are bound to shape how they 
interpret its history. Hence, attempting to understand how bioethics emerged as a field of 
inquiry and eventually became institutionalized requires considering its history as an 
ongoing academic endeavor.  
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Another feature that the various histories of bioethics share is the tendency to 
highlight and review certain influential texts, without fully exploring their impact. 
Preferring to investigate the growth of bioethics in terms of key events, controversial 
issues, and gradual cultural change, many authors barely mention the appearance of 
several books that were meant to provide an appropriate theoretical foundation for 
bioethics.  The lack of attention given to these works is largely due to the fact that none of 
the frameworks developed in these books became universally accepted by the bioethics 
community. However, to define the value of these texts in terms of their ability to unify a 
field as diverse and inclusive as bioethics is to misconstrue their significance. The true 
importance of the first few bioethics texts lies in the role they played in initiating the 
process of defining the structure, methodology, and scope of a largely ill-defined field. By 
promoting reflection on defining an appropriate methodology, these texts catalyzed 
bioethics’ transition from a nebulous discourse to a recognized field of inquiry.  
Of all the texts that sought to define a satisfactory theoretical framework for 
bioethics, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics was the 
most successful. This book is considered the cannon of bioethics and is mentioned in 
practically every account of its history and evolution.2  Despite its canonical status, why it 
deserves such distinction and how it shaped bioethics is given the same scant attention that 
the other early books receive.  In this essay, I attempt to demonstrate why Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics is often considered the magnum opus of bioethics. I will also highlight 
how it, more than any other text, contributed to bioethics’ development into the respected 
academic field it is today. In so doing, I argue that the importance of Beauchamp and 
5
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Childress’s book lies in the applicability of their methodology to real-life ethical problems, 
and not the absolute correctness of their theoretical framework.  
 
Disputed Origins   
Bioethics began as a public discourse that arose in response to increasing interest in 
emerging ethical questions related to developments in science, technology, and medicine. 3 
The origin of this open and widespread discussion of ethical issues can be traced back to 
the post World War II era.4  This was a period where a host of ethical dilemmas in medicine 
and scientific research were brought to public attention. Not only did these ethics cases 
grab the attention of the public, they also intrigued many academics. In fact, many scholars 
chose to leave their parent disciplines of philosophy, theology, and law in order to immerse 
themselves in the new ethical controversies. It was these migrant academics that became 
the first bioethicists and who defined bioethics’ gradual transition from a disorganized 
scholarly dialogue to a recognized academic field. Hence, the emergence of bioethics was 
the result of increasingly pervasive public discussion of ethical concerns and classically 
trained scholars taking an interest in these practical issues for the first time.   
If asked to give a short synopsis of how bioethics began, most bioethicists would 
provide something akin to the paragraph above. This type of summary certainly highlights 
some of the most important and well-known features of bioethics’ emergence, but it also 
gives the false impression that there is one, universally agreed upon history of bioethics.  
As Fox and Swazey convey in Observing Bioethics, there are so many divergent 
interpretations of how bioethics emerged that they can be separated into several different 
general categories: those driven by technology, those built around issues, those focusing on 
6
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events, those based on institutionalization, and those rooted in gradual, multi-causal 
growth.5  The plethora of “origin stories” can be partially explained by the fact that those 
recounting bioethics’ history are figures that have been central to its growth and 
development.6  Since its history is being told largely by those who have an unquestionable 
bias, most accounts of the emergence and growth of bioethics must be regarded with some 
skepticism. Nevertheless, tracing bioethics’ transition from a loose discourse to an 
institutionalized field does not require discounting the historical inquiries published thus 
far. Simply regarding the analysis of bioethics’ beginnings and early history as a work-in-
progress will suffice for the purposes of my study.   
One of the most common methods of constructing bioethics’ history is connecting its 
origin to particular technological developments, controversial issues, and landmark events. 
For instance, many bioethicists see the discovery of controversial human experiments such 
as, the Nazi medical experiments and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, as crucial to the genesis 
of bioethics.7  Specific technological advances in biomedicine are also popular “moments of 
creation.”8 Bioethicist Albert Jonsen, for example, maintains that the development of the 
Scribner shunt, a device that made sustained renal dialysis for patients with severe chronic 
kidney disease possible, set the stage for the beginning of bioethics.9 For Jonsen, the 1961 
creation of a selection committee in Seattle, Washington, that decided which patients 
would receive life-saving kidney dialysis, marked the birth of bioethics.10 While bioethics 
was certainly shaped by a variety of different controversial issues, technological 
developments, and monumental events, choosing one of these factors as the crucial catalyst 
is to create a decidedly reductionist history. In addition, seeing bioethics’ origin and growth 
7
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as purely a reactionary phenomenon is to rely on something akin to technological 
determinism to construct its history.   
Another aspect of the field’s beginnings that tends to be presented in a simplistic 
manner is the origin of the actual term bioethics. In most histories, the coining of the word 
bioethics is told as a straightforward, factual story.  The problem with this type of 
presentation is that it glosses over quite a bit of controversy.  
There are actually two major divergent accounts. One version attributes the coining 
of the term to American biochemist Van Rensselaer Potter. According to this version of the 
story, in 1970, Potter created the term bioethics to refer to “the integration of biology and 
values…designed to guide human survival.”11  His conception of the meaning of bioethics 
encompassed a broad interconnectedness between the environment, public health, and 
morality.12  A second account begins at the home of Sergeant Shriver. As the story goes, in 
1970, Andreé Hellegers, the President of Georgetown University, met with Sergeant Shriver 
and his wife Eunice Kennedy Shriver to discuss the possibility of the Kennedy family’s 
sponsorship for an institute that would study the ethical problems that were appearing in 
science and medicine.  During this discussion, Shriver apparently suggested that the field 
that this institute would study should be called bioethics, since it was a marriage of biology 
and ethics.13  Which one of these two figures invented the term bioethics is hotly debated 
among scholars.  
The histories that present the beginnings of bioethics as a multi-factorial process 
that occurred gradually over time avoid the methodological pitfalls associated with, what 
Fox and Swazey call, a “big bang” thesis.14  Seeing bioethics’ emergence as a complex and 
gradual process is a perspective that a handful of chroniclers share. In addition to Fox and 
8
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Swazey, Albert Jonsen, in his book The Birth of Bioethics, and social scientist David 
Rothman, in his book Strangers at the Bedside, maintain that the origin of bioethics was a 
multi-factorial process that took place over the course of a few decades. While these 
scholars all share a similar historical point of view, there is some variation in the time 
frame and the combination of factors that each author attributes to bioethics’ emergence.  
A thorough examination of the plausibility, strengths, and weakness of each of their 
accounts is beyond the scope of this essay. Nevertheless, there is enough general 
agreement between their accounts to facilitate a broad understanding of how bioethics 
began and evolved.  
 
Human Experimentation: Catalyzing “Bioethical” Discussion   
Concern over ethical human experimentation is an issue that Fox and Swazey, 
Jonsen, and Rothman all consider significant to the emergence of bioethics. To Jonsen, the 
discovery of the Nazi medical experiments and the subsequent crafting of the Nuremberg 
Code in 1947 marked the beginning of bioethics’ gradual formation. He sees the years 
following World War II as the “beginning of an amorphous expression of concern about the 
untoward effect of advances in biomedical science” and as the beginning of a forty-year 
period “during which bioethics emerged as a distinct discipline and discourse.”15  Rothman 
and Fox and Swazey consider the Nuremburg trials to be a premature starting point for 
bioethics. As Fox and Swazey point out, while some events that were important to the 
emergence of bioethics did arise in response to the Nuremburg trials, in general, “the Nazi 
medical experiments and the Code drew little attention.”16  In addition, Rothman explains 
that the Nuremberg trails earned minimal press coverage and that American researchers 
9
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and physicians often found the Code “irrelevant to their own work.”17  Furthermore, few 
American academics were writing about ethical issues in scientific research and medical 
practice during the 1950s and 1960s.18  While the discovery of the grossly unethical Nazi 
experiments seems like the perfect beginning for bioethics, as bioethicist Arthur Caplan 
observes: “it simply did not happen that way.”19      
Rothman relates the beginning of public concern over human experimentation to, 
Harvard Medical School professor, Henry Beecher’s 1966 publication of a monumental 
article in the New England Journal of Medicine exposing a host of unethical human 
experimentation practices in the United States.20 According to Rothman, Beecher’s  
“devastating indictment of research ethics helped inspire the movement that brought a 
new set of rules and a new set of players to medical decision making.”21  Unlike the Nazi 
medical experiments, Beecher’s citation of twenty-two examples of investigators risking 
the lives of subjects without their informed consent created a furor within the medical 
community and in the public sphere.22  The controversy sparked by Beecher’s exposé and 
the subsequent revelation of other disgraceful experiments, such as the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study, led to a general consensus that research ethics should no longer be left to discretion 
of individual investigators.  
Fox and Swazey both consider the Nazi medical experiments and Beecher’s paper to 
be events that played an important role in initiating bioethics’ formation. However, they do 
not weigh their significance in the same manner as Jonsen and Rothman. Instead, Fox and 
Swazey prefer to regard these events as a small part of bioethics’ initial formative phase. 
They describe this first phase of bioethics as a period beginning in the 1950s where ethical 
issues, largely pertaining to human experimentation, were being discussed by scholars 
10
Momentum, Vol. 1 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 16
https://repository.upenn.edu/momentum/vol1/iss1/16
  11 
inside and outside the medical community for the first time.23  It was in this period, for 
example, that the first symposiums and conferences devoted to human experimentation 
were organized.24  Furthermore, while less influential than his 1966 exposé, Henry Beecher 
outlined his concerns with the prevalence of unethical behavior in medical research in a 
book titled Experimentation in Man and a paper with the same title in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association in 1959.25 To Fox and Swazey, the relatively limited 
discussion of human experimentation in the 1950s marked the tentative beginning of what 
later became pervasive discussion of bioethical issues.  
 
Bioethics: Intellectual Endeavor and Cultural Movement 
The period beginning in the 1960s and ending in the mid-1970s is when Jonsen, 
Rothman, and Fox and Swazey agree that bioethics became a discernible field of inquiry.   
It was in this short timeframe that social and cultural change, the implications of 
advancements in science and technology, and concerns about the rights of research 
subjects and patients all coalesced into the development of bioethics. While it is nearly 
impossible to discern precisely how each new issue, landmark event, or scandal affected 
bioethics’ growth and development, tracing a few general trends provides a great deal of 
insight into its formation. The first of these trends, public concern over human 
experimentation, has already been partially explored.      
By the mid-1960s, the initial concern about human experimentation was no longer 
an issue that a handful of scholars in the medical community deemed worthy of 
consideration.  During this period, those outside of the medical establishment began to take 
notice of the pervasive ethical abuses in clinical research. With theologians and 
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philosophers beginning to examine ethical dilemmas in modern medicine for the first time, 
a new kind of discussion began to unfold. Joining concerned investigators, such as Henry 
Beecher, these early bioethicists began to question the applicability of the centuries-old 
medical ethical tradition1 to issues like human experimentation.26  
Most of the early bioethicists’ initial critiques of human experimentation dealt with 
the moral permissibility of general social benefit being allowed to outweigh individual 
rights and interests. One of the first scholars to raise these kinds of objections was 
Christian ethicist Paul Ramsey.  In his book Patient as Person, Ramsey articulated his fear 
that the medical community’s obsession with scientific progress was putting the individual 
at risk.27   For Ramsey, the root of the conflict of interest between the “omnivorous appetite 
of scientific research” and the welfare of subjects was the reliance on a utilitarian cost-
benefit analysis.28 His strategy to address these problems was two-fold.  First, Ramsey 
proposed moving ethical problems in medicine, such as human experimentation, out of the 
domain of experts and into the public sphere.29  Second, he called for a commitment to a 
subject’s ability to consent in order to check the power of individual investigators.30  While 
Ramsey’s book did not provide a comprehensive treatise for ethical human 
experimentation, his work did articulate a growing concern that those inside the medical 
establishment could not adequately define an appropriate ethical code for this area on their 
own.     
                                                 
1 Medical ethics has a much longer history than bioethics. Its origin and development is often credited to the 
Hippocratic writers. Now, medical ethics is often considered a sub-category within bioethics. It is much 
narrower in scope than bioethics since it usually focuses on the doctor-patient relationship and on the virtues 
that a doctor needs to be a good practitioner. In addition, medical ethics largely deals with ethical dilemmas 
that occur in clinical settings. Even though bioethics is the broader term, since medical ethics is often 
considered to be under the umbrella of bioethics, both terms will be used interchangeably in this essay.  
12
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The emergence of interprofessional institutes is another indication that those 
outside of the medical community were beginning to take interest in its problems. The 
early activity of the Law-Medicine Institute at Boston University, formed in 1958, serves as 
an illustrative example. This free-standing institute was designed to address the 
medicolegal aspects of medicine and public health using an interprofessional approach.31  
While these kinds of interdisciplinary institutions are commonplace today, they were 
practically unheard of during the late 1950s. Hence, the Institute thought it necessary to 
choose a research project that would demonstrate the strength of their decidedly 
“experimental” methodology. 32  The topic that seemed best suited for this task was the 
legal, moral, and ethical implications of medical experimentation on human subjects.33  The 
fact that the Institute chose human experimentation as the subject of their first research 
project is telling. It shows that conducting a multi-disciplinary investigation of the ethical 
and legal issues surrounding human experimentation was deemed to be an appropriate 
venture in the late 1950s.  Furthermore, the structure of the Institute’s first research 
project indicates that it was becoming increasingly apparent to academics that biomedical 
issues that have societal implications, like human experimentation, should be analyzed 
from a variety of disciplinary perspectives.   
 The appearance of interdisciplinary symposia also demonstrates the growing 
academic interest in the ethical issues surrounding human experimentation.  For instance, 
in November of 1967 and September of 1968, Deadalus put together a series of conferences 
titled “Ethical Aspects of Experimentation with Human Subjects”.34 According to Rothman, 
this was the first time this largely interdisciplinary publication devoted so much careful 
attention to a medical matter.35 Rothman also points out that out of the fifteen contributors, 
13
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only six “came from the health sciences.36  The other eleven had backgrounds in law, 
anthropology, sociology, philosophy, and psychiatry.37  This series of conferences, and 
others like it, demonstrates that Ramsey’s desire for ethical issues in modern medicine to 
become part of the public domain was beginning to happen.    
The cultural tumult that occurred during the 1960s is another important factor to 
keep in mind when tracing the beginnings of bioethics.  As Fox and Swazey, Jonsen, and 
Rothman all point out, the cultural changes that began in the 1960s certainly shaped 
bioethics’ formation.  To Rothman, the desire to apply principles and the language of rights 
to human experimentation coincidently fit quite nicely with the social current of the 
1960s.38   This decade, more than any other in American history, was marked by a series of 
cultural campaigns that sought the abdication of intuitional authority and restructuring of 
the prevailing social order. For instance, the African-American Civil Rights Movement, and 
the subsequent human rights movements modeled after it, helped to foster a political 
climate that was highly sensitive to the rights and interests of socially oppressed 
minorities.39  This period was also defined by a general skepticism of authority and 
powerful institutions.  Hence, the notion that researchers and physicians were to be trusted 
unilaterally because of their expertise and commitment to benevolence was being seriously 
questioned for the first time in the 1960s. Given the gradual reorientation of social thought 
that occurred throughout the decade, it is not surprising that the public began to support 
protecting subjects from the potential harms that could result from investigators failing to 
respect their individual rights.  This climate of political and social change made the 
philosopher’s desire to examine medical issues in terms of guiding principles and 
individual rights especially alluring.    
14
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The increasing involvement of philosophers and theologians in the medical arena 
became especially apparent by the mid-1970s. The work of the National Commission for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research serves as an 
illustrative example. Largely in response to the highly publicized scandal that resulted from 
the discovery of the syphilis studies conducted on uninformed, poorly-educated, 
impoverished African-American males from 1932 to 1972 in Tuskegee, Alabama, Congress 
passed the National Research Act on July 12, 1974.  With the passage of this legislation, 
Congress also created the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical Research.  Its central duty was to “identify the basic ethical principles that 
should underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioral research involving human 
subjects and to develop guidelines which should be followed to assure that such research is  
conducted in accordance with those principles.”40 This commission included twelve 
members with a variety of disciplinary backgrounds, including biomedical science, law, 
sociology, theology, and philosophy.  The multidisciplinary nature of this committee is of 
particular importance. First, the fact only four of its twelve members were affiliated with 
biomedicine indicates that by the mid-1970s any inclination that human experimentation 
was an issue to be handled by the medical establishment had disappeared. Second, the 
presence of bioethicist Albert Jonsen and Christian ethicist Karen Lebacqz indicates that 
those trained in philosophy and theology were seen as integral commentators on ethical 
issues by the mid-1970s.       
The Commission’s final recommendations, complied in The Belmont Report in 1979, 
demonstrate the level of authority over ethical issues that philosophers had gained by the 
late 1970s.  The way in which the guidelines for research with human subjects are 
15
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presented in the Report is especially telling. Unlike the vague NIH guidelines for human 
experimentation that neither required investigators to obtain informed consent in all cases 
nor offered a practical definition of consent in general, the Belmont Report contains a fairly 
concrete and understandable explanation of informed consent. In addition, this definition 
of informed consent is explicitly grounded in the principle of respect for persons. The 
concept of respect for persons is not presented simply as an idealistic platitude meant to 
evoke notions of liberty and freedom. Instead, this principle is described as a moral 
requirement that demands explicit acknowledgement of a subject’s right of self-
determination and an obligation to protect individuals with diminished autonomy. By using 
the language of rights and obligations and by explicitly appealing to abstract principles, like 
respect for persons, the Belmont Report displays a distinct commitment to applying 
philosophy to the ethics of human experimentation. Containing the first carefully 
constructed definition of informed consent, with its moral weight justified in terms of 
abstract principles, the Belmont Report demonstrates that the idea of applying 
philosophical theory to ethical issues in science and medicine had become an acceptable 
approach.    
While The Belmont Report was certainly an important document in bioethics’ 
history, its subject matter is not so indicative of the field’s discourse at the time.   By the 
mid-1970s, the prevailing interest in human experimentation had given way to other 
pressing ethical issues. At this point, Fox asserts, “concern about life and death and 
personhood issues at the beginning and end of the life cycle, began to take up more 
medical, philosophical, and legal space in bioethical discussion.”41 To Fox, this shift in focus 
from human experimentation to issues like abortion, euthanasia, and foregoing life 
16
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sustaining treatment marked the second phase of bioethics.42  Dan Callahan, on the other 
hand, considers “death and dying, genetics, reproductive biology and population issues, 
and behavior control” to be the key ethical issues of the 1970s.43  According to Jonsen, 
concerns over organ transplantation and the effort of the ad hoc 1968 Harvard Medical 
School Committee to redefine the definition of death also influenced bioethics discussion in 
the 1970s.44 This disagreement over which issues were most prominent during the 1970s 
illustrates just how expansive beioethics’ scope had become.  
In addition to an expansion in scope, the 1970s also marked the beginning of 
bioethics’ institutionalization. Two of the field’s most influential centers were founded 
during this period. The first American bioethics center called the American bioethics 
centers the Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences, otherwise known as the 
Hasting Center, was created in 1969. Shortly after the appearance of the freestanding 
Hastings Center, another major bioethics center came into existence. In 1971, the Joseph 
and Rose Kennedy Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction and Bioethics, also 
known as the Kennedy Center at Georgetown, was established.  Just a year after the 
Kennedy center was born, a third bioethics center called the Pope John XXIII Medical-Moral 
Research Center, also known as The National Catholic Bioethics Center, was erected in 
Saint Louis. Besides the recognition these centers provided for bioethics by simply existing, 
they also gave the developing field a sense of legitimacy by creating scholarly journals.  The 
first bioethics journal, The Hastings Center Report, was published in 1971 by, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the Institute for Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences. According to Fox and 
Swazey, the emergence of the first centers and publications devoted entirely to bioethical 
issues indicated that “bioethics had arrived” as a recognizable field of inquiry.45   
17
Piarulli: Forming Bioethics
Published by ScholarlyCommons, 2012
  18 
The Search for Methodological Unity  
The widespread scholarly discussion of ethical issues during the 1960s and 1970s 
unquestionably played a major role in crystallizing bioethics into a recognizable field of 
inquiry. However, constructing a discourse around controversial issues was only a 
tentative first step. Since many of the first bioethicists were migrants from other 
disciplines, the early bioethics literature had little theoretical or methodological unity. 
According to Jonsen, the field’s early literature was comprised largely of essays, articles, 
and anthologies devoted to discussing the “current perplexing cases and issues” but 
offering little “in the way of methodology.”46  The first influential texts were no better. For 
instance, Paul Ramsey’s Patient as Person certainly represented one of the first thorough 
attempts to apply philosophy and theology to dilemmas that were once restricted to the 
medical community. As credence to the importance and novelty of Ramsey’s undertaking, 
his book dominated the first decade of bioethics.47  However, it was considered to be 
severely lacking from a methodological standpoint.48  Given the lack of unity in the early 
bioethics literature, searching for theories, frameworks, and methodologies became a 
major priority.  It was this search for a definitive structure that led to bioethics’ gradual 
transformation from a disconnected discourse to a recognized field of inquiry.  
Since the first bioethicists had backgrounds in theology and philosophy, their first 
inclination when analyzing ethical issues was to apply broad, philosophical theories to 
determine the right course of action. This application of theory marked a distinct departure 
from previous academic ethics.  Throughout its long disciplinary tradition, philosophers 
were largely uninterested in applying grand theories to real–life ethical quandaries. 
Instead, those that focused on ethics were generally interested in disagreements at the 
18
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metaethical level.49  By the 1960s, this disciplinary disinterest in practical matters began to 
erode. One important causal factor of this shift was the growing frustration with the ridged 
and formal methods of moral philosophy.50  In addition, many young philosophers were 
becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the prevailing orthodoxy that restricted the 
domain of moral philosophy to the analysis and definition of terms such as, “right”, “duty”, 
“value”, and “good.”51  Yet another crucial factor that pushed many philosophers to 
consider applying ethics to practical matters was the increasing focus on the limitations of 
medical ethics.  As we have seen, before concerns over the ethical implications of human 
experimentation became prevalent, medical ethics was restricted to the medical 
establishment.  For the most part, medical ethics was seen as a sort of professional ethics 
that was developed by physicians and was solely for physicians. Hence, there was a 
widespread neglect of medical ethics among philosophers.52  It was the combination of this 
frustration with the current state of moral philosophy and the increasing public interest in 
ethical issues that sparked the shift in how philosophers dealt with and related to academic 
ethics.   
As more and more philosophers and theologians left their parent disciplines in 
order to tackle new and interesting ethical issues, metaphysical language began to 
permeate the early bioethics discourse. This tendency to apply Western philosophy to 
public controversies quickly became a defining feature of bioethics. Hence, the desire to 
move philosophical reasoning out of the academy and to begin applying it in the public 
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As we have seen, the 1950s through the mid-1960s constituted a prologue of sorts 
for bioethics.  During this period there was widespread concern about the ethical 
implications of certain advances in science and medicine, but there was no unified method 
for analyzing these issues.53  By the late 1970s, however, these pervasive concerns evolved 
into careful analyses articulated in the form of books, essays, and lectures.54  Even after 
about a decade and a half of commentary on ethical issues, bioethics still did not have any 
uniform theories and methodologies of its own.  When reflecting on the state of bioethics in 
1979, Jonsen declared that “the ethics of medicine is now in need not of more anthologies 
but of a comprehensive treatise revealing how ethical theory can be cogently applied to the 
sorts of decisions encountered in medical practice.”55 According to another major 
contributor to bioethics, Robert Veatch, Beauchamp and Childress’s Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics made the first pioneering steps towards providing the “comprehensive treatise” that 
bioethics needed. 56 
 
Bioethics’ Big Book  
The first edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics appeared in 1979.  In this book, 
Beauchamp and Childress made the first real attempt to provide some type of unified 
approach to bioethics. Before the publication of Principles of Biomedical Ethics (hereafter 
referred to as Principles) there was no one approach to bioethics that all bioethicists 
supported. In constructing their book, Beauchamp and Childress attempted to fill the 
perceived need for a comprehensive framework that could be applied to ethical problems 
in modern medicine. The authors did this by providing a “systematic analysis of the moral 
principles that should apply to biomedicine.”57  In short, they defined four ethical principles 
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that were inherently separate from medical practice. These four principles are autonomy, 
beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice, and they were designed to provide a framework 
for the identification and analysis of moral problems.58  
Interestingly, there is some scholarly debate surrounding the origin of the four 
principles.  According to Jonsen, and many of the other chroniclers of the history of 
bioethics as well, the framework for the four principles was provided by the Belmont 
Report. Since the three principles that were presented in the Belmont Report (respect for 
persons, beneficence, and justice) bore such a striking resemblance to the four principles 
(autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice) articulated in Principles, in both title 
and content, many bioethics asserted that the Belmont principles must have served as the 
basis for the four principles.   
 Beauchamp adamantly disagrees with this assumption. He asserts that “such 
speculation about origins fails to appreciate that both works were written simultaneously, 
the one inevitably influencing the other.”59  Beauchamp claims that toward the end of 1975, 
he and Childress began lecturing and writing on the material that would later become 
Principles.60 Toward the end of 1976, after he and Childress had been working on the 
conceptualization of Principles for the better part of a year, he became involved in the 
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research.61  Once he joined the Commission he was assigned to write the Belmont Paper, 
which later became known by its more recognizable title the Belmont Report.62   According 
to Beauchamp, before he joined the Commission he was informed that those who attended 
the Belmont retreat (he was not a member of the Commission when the initial meetings 
were held) had outlined a “rough schema” of the ethical principles, “respect for persons”, 
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“beneficence”, and “justice”, but none of the original members of the Commission had given 
these principles much meaning.63  Ultimately, Beauchamp was assigned the task of giving 
“shape and substance” to the Belmont Paper.64   
The assignment of writing the Belmont Paper was quite a Herculean task. According 
to Beauchamp, not only had he not attended the meeting at which these principles were 
discussed, there was also very little content concerning principles in the pre-existing 
draft.65 Essentially, Beauchamp was meant to define the general meaning of these 
principles, ground them in moral philosophy (without being too abstract), and explain how 
these principles applied to human experimentation.  At first this project seemed to be 
something akin to freshman hazing. Since Beauchamp was an ad hoc addition to the 
Commission, it seems only natural that he, a philosopher only six years out of graduate 
school, would be assigned the least desirable task.66  However, once Beauchamp realized 
that he could relate the work on defining principles for clinical practice and health policy, 
with which he and Childress were currently occupied, to the task of explicating the 
principles meant to govern human research, he “began to be more inspired by the 
assignment.”67    
Beauchamp maintains that throughout his work on the Belmont Paper, he drew 
heavily on the materials on principles and theories that he and Childress had gathered for 
their upcoming book.68 He also explains that since many of the Commissioners wanted a 
“minimalist statement relatively free of the style of academic philosophy”, he was forced to 
cut out much “bolder philosophical defenses of the principles.”69 The sections that were 
removed from the paper did not go to waste. Beauchamp claims he saved the work that 
was not included in the final version of the Belmont Report and refashioned it for 
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Principles.70  Much of the work on research ethics that is included in Principles, Beauchamp 
explains, came from his work for the Commission.71  Hence, it seems as though 
Beauchamp’s experience with expounding the Belmont principles led him and Childress to 
include an analysis of research ethics that might have otherwise been excluded.  
In order to demonstrate that the four-principle system was not an offshoot of his 
work on the Belmont Report, Beauchamp points out that he and Childress had already 
submitted the prospectus for their book to Oxford University Press by the time the 
Commission had its first retreat.72  To further this point, he asserts that once he “grasped 
the moral vision of the National Commission” he could tell that he and Childress had some 
fundamental disagreements with their point of view.73  First, he asserts that an important 
distinction between the two sets of principles is that the Belmont Report only includes 
three principles, whereas he and Childress identify four distinct principles that are 
important to medical ethics. According to Beauchamp, he and Childress claim that a crucial 
part of their framework is the separation of beneficence and nonmaleficence, a distinction 
that the Commission failed to make.74  Second, Beauchamp also sees significant differences 
between the principle of autonomy and the Commission’s articulation of the principle of 
respect for persons. To Beauchamp, the Commission’s version of respect for persons 
seemed to blend two very different principles: the principle of respect for autonomy and 
the principle of avoiding the causation of harm to incompetent persons.75   
Whether or not these differences between the two sets of principles are significant 
enough to justify Beauchamp’s conclusion that “the two frameworks are not coherent with 
one another” is a matter of scholarly debate.76  Like the debate that surrounds the 
beginning of bioethics, the origin of the four principles is seen as an important piece of 
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bioethics history.  As is the case with many perceived milestones, there is bound to be 
disagreement about the arrival of such a canonical text. 
The principles that Beauchamp and Childress formulated are meant to be mid-level 
and thus mitigate between the impracticality of applying high-level ethical theories and the 
difficulty of prioritizing the different values of low-level common morality.77  Thus, not only 
did this book offer the clearly articulated framework that bioethics was previously missing, 
it also attempted to address the issue of the appropriate balance of theory and practice.  
The fact that Beauchamp and Childress offer a system of mid-level ethics is one of 
the most well-known features of their approach. However, to really understand what is 
meant by mid-level principles, the terms high-level moral theory and low-level common 
morality need to be explained.  In short, a high-level moral theory is a broad ethical theory 
that deals with “the standards and principles of moral reasoning.”78 Among bioethicists, 
moral theories are generally thought to be too difficult to be applied effectively to 
complicated bioethical controversies because it is too difficult to codify morality into a set 
of rules united under a single theory.79 
 Common morality, in contrast, is more difficult to define. As defined by Beauchamp 
and Childress, common morality is “the set of norms shared by all persons committed to 
morality” and it is “applicable to all persons in all places.”80  A few examples of norms that 
fall under common morality are “do not kill”, “tell the truth” and “do not steal.”81 Thus, 
common morality is best understood as the norms that all persons deem to be binding 
without question. However, two problems arise with the norms of common morality. First, 
as bioethicist S. Holm suggests, it is difficult to show that there really are “norms that all 
morally serious persons share” and defining common morality in this manner lends itself to 
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circular reasoning.82  Second, the norms of common morality often conflict in daily life and 
it may be difficult to decide which one takes precedence in a given situation. Given the 
inherent difficulty of using either ethical theories or common morality, looking for some 
type of middle ground seems logical. This is exactly what Beauchamp and Childress aimed 
for in Principles. 
Not only do Beauchamp and Childress advocate mid-level ethics, they also offer 
principles instead of theories.  A principle or moral norm can be thought of as a rule of 
acceptable moral conduct that is identified or justified by ethical theories.83 As was 
previously mentioned, Beauchamp and Childress identified four principles that can be used 
in practical moral decision-making. At a basic level, the principle of autonomy demands 
that the decision-making capabilities of a person should be respected. Beneficence can be 
seen as the commitment to doing good for others.  Nonmaleficence is basically refraining 
from actions that do harm, and justice is best described as the fair, equitable distribution of 
harms and benefits. In addition to being able to defer to these principles when analyzing 
ethical problems, Beauchamp and Childress also claim that their principles are prima facie 
binding. In other words, a principle is applicable to a given situation until it is proven 
inapplicable or is considered of lower priority to some other principle, norm, or value. 
These principles are best understood as “action-guides” in a moral dilemma and their 
application is demonstrated via several case studies, most of which are clinical, throughout 
Principles.84  
Although Beauchamp and Childress are very adamant about the fact that their 
approach is not an ethical theory, they do consider theories to be an important justification 
for their principles. They make their understanding of the relationship between ethical 
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theories and principles quite clear very early in their book.  They claim that “to be 
justified2, one’s principle’s must themselves be defensible” and therefore rooted in 
philosophical theory.85 However, Beauchamp and Childress do not argue that their 
principles must be supported by one ethical tradition. Instead, they claim that their 
principles can be supported by multiple ethical theories. For instance, even though 
Beauchamp and Childress each claim to prefer classically opposing ethical traditions, rule 
utilitarianism and rule deontology respectively, they believe that both of these traditions 
can be used to justify principles. In examining the metaethical strengths and weaknesses of 
both theories, Beauchamp and Childress conclude: 
Many forms of rule utilitarianism and rule deontology lead to identical rules and 
actions. It is possible from both utilitarian and deontological standpoints to defend 
the same rules…and to assign them roughly the same weight.86  
Thus, while there may be irreconcilable differences between rule utilitarians and rule 
deontologists at the metaethical level, the two theories converge at the lower level of 
principles, which is what matters for a principle-based framework.87  Furthermore, 
because Beauchamp and Childress both agree on the same framework of four principles, 
despite their divergent metaethical proclivities, they argue that there is no need to commit 
to a single theory when using their system. The fact that multiple ethical theories justify the 
                                                 
2
 Exactly how Beauchamp and Childress’s mid-level principles are justified has been a major point of 
contention. Initially, they claimed that broad theories served as justification for the principles. However, 
many of their colleagues have asserted that the way in which theory justifies their principles has not been 
made sufficiently clear. In their latest edition, Beauchamp and Childress have moved away from rooting their 
principles in philosophical theories and have emphasized the importance of common morality in justifying 
moral decision making. Although what serves as the ethical justification for the four principles is not so clear, 
the fact that they are a middle ground between theory and common morality still remains true.    
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four principles is a critical aspect of Beauchamp and Childress’s approach. In many ways 
this theoretical flexibility is one of the strongest features of their framework.   
The scheme that Beauchamp and Childress use to link theory and practice is also 
worth mentioning. The overall structure of their interpretation of the relationship between 
theory and practice is explained in a straightforward four-tier diagram. This diagram 
shows the four hierarchical levels of justification. At the bottom-most level is what ought to 
be done in a given situation. These actions are rationalized by referencing higher-level 
moral rules, which are justified by principles that are in turn rooted in philosophical 
theories.88 Within this seemingly simple four-tier structure Beauchamp and Childress 
identify the four principles as the level of justification most useful to dilemmas in medical 
ethics and to ethical issues in general.  
Beauchamp and Childress’s framework for bioethics bears striking resemblance to 
sociologist Robert K. Merton’s middle range theory for sociological theorizing. The 
similarity lies in the way that both parties advocate approaches that mitigate between 
broad theories and rules that can be derived from mundane daily activity. For Merton, 
middle range sociological theories are those that “lie between the minor but necessary 
working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all 
inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed 
uniformities of social behavior, social organization and change.”89  Not only does Merton 
advocate a similar relationship between the theoretical and the practical as Beauchamp 
and Childress, he also portrays his middle range approach as being a means to organize the 
empirical data obtained in sociological research. For example, in describing the use of 
middle range theory, Merton explains that the “middle-range theory is principally used in 
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sociology to guide empirical inquiry.”90  This desire to have a structure for empirical data in 
sociology is comparable to Beauchamp and Childress’s desire to outline a system of ethics 
that can be used in practical situations. The similarity between middle level principles and 
middle range theory demonstrates that even fields that are not rooted in moral philosophy 
share difficulty in moving between theory and practice. Thus, Beauchamp and Childress 
had the same concerns about bioethics as members of much more established disciplines 
had about their own methods. 
Eventually, bioethicists became so concerned with how to balance theory and 
practice that significant scholarly attention was devoted to specifying the four principles, in 
order to make them easier to use in actual cases.  As bioethicist David DeGrazia explains in 
his essay “Moving Forward in Bioethical Theory”, the major weakness of Beauchamp and 
Childress’s approach is that it seems to rely on intuition to decide which principle to favor 
in a given situation.91  In order to remedy this problem, DeGrazia offers specified 
principlism as an alternative.  
Using Henry Richardson’s concept of specifying norms as a guide, DeGrazia claims 
that a similar procedure can be used to refine the four principles. In short, DeGrazia asserts 
that through the process of specification, Beauchamp and Childress’s four principles can 
branch out into more and more specific rules and norms depending on the demands of the 
specific case.92  Hence, when two principles conflict, say autonomy and beneficence, 
DeGrazia claims that instead of relying on intuitive weighing and balancing of the 
principles themselves, one can be revised into a more specific norm that can be used to 
resolve the conflict.93  He does offer an additional caveat for this seemingly straightforward 
process. According to DeGrazia, whenever a principle is specified it must be done in such a 
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way that “maintains or increases the coherence of the total set of norms found reflectively 
acceptable.”94  Basically, each time a principle is specified one must make sure the newly 
refined norm does not contradict other norms in the moral framework.  If the specified 
norm does conflict with other norms, one must be further specified to resolve this clash. 
Whether or not specification solves the problem of conflicting principles is a matter of 
considerable scholarly debate.  What can be agreed upon, however, is that Beauchamp and 
Childress have embraced the concept of specified principles and have made an effort to 
rework their framework to reflect this process.    
 
Competing Theories and Approaches  
Other members of the bioethics community, besides Beauchamp and Childless, were 
also concerned with the proper relationship between theory and practice in bioethics. As 
has been discussed, Beauchamp and Childress were of the opinion that general theories 
were too broad to be useful in complex cases.  Some early bioethicists, however, did not 
share Beauchamp and Childress’s view that no one theory could unit bioethics. Several 
pioneering bioethicists felt that bioethics deserved “a more unique theoretical foundation 
than the routine invocation of standard theories of moral philosophy”, but were not ready 
to disregard the usefulness of theory altogether.95 Hence, in the midst of bioethics’ search 
for methodological unity, a few bioethicists took up the challenge of creating a single theory 
for the field.  
In 1981, bioethicist Robert Veatch took on the challenge of creating a general theory 
for bioethics.96 In his book A Theory of Medical Ethics, Veatch “intended to articulate 
foundations for a general medical ethic that were rooted in philosophical thought.”97  
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Veatch was not the only bioethicist to take on this Herculean task. Bioethicist Tristram 
Engelhardt also attempted to create a central theory for the field. In his 1986 book, 
Foundations of Bioethics, he argued that ethics “could be conceived as an ‘enterprise in 
controversy resolution’ which consists of seeking, by free agreement to commonly 
accepted procedures, to resolve controversies without resort to force.”98  Edmund 
Pellegrino, a physician, and David Thomasma, a theologian, joined Vetch and Engelhardt in 
their endeavor. Pellegrino and Thomasma “collaborated on a general theory of medical 
ethics set firmly on medical beneficence.”99  They articulated their theory in two books, A 
Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice and For the Patient’s Good.100  Although all of these 
books addressed bioethics’ need for a discernable structure, none of these theories gained 
universal support among bioethicists.   
The failure of these general theories to gain traction was due to multiple factors. 
One of the reasons was that even though Veatch, Engelhardt, and Pellegrino and Thomasma 
all presented theories that offered “valuables insights” into the appropriate philosophical 
foundation for bioethics, each of their theories had distinct flaws. Veatch’s approach was 
criticized for being too hypothetical.101 Engelhardt’s logic was faulted for being “too 
morally thin.”102  Pellegrino and Thomasma’s model was too “ontological” to gain 
acceptance in the field.103 Besides these unique, inherent flaws, there is a secondary, and 
perhaps more important, explanation for the lack of large-scale acceptance of these 
theories. Jonsen claims that the lack of enthusiasm for these theories may also be explained 
by the fact that bioethics tended to focus on practical problems since its very beginning.104  
Furthermore, early bioethicists had often tried to apply theories from their original 
disciplines to the ethical dilemmas and usually found them to be utterly unhelpful. Since 
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the application of broad theories to ethics cases already seemed like a dead-end approach 
for the field, it is not surprising that early bioethicists would be quick to dismiss new 
theories, even if they were designed specifically for bioethics.  
About two decades after Veatch, Engelhardt, and Pellegrino and Thomasma offered 
their broad theories, Danner Clouser and Bernard Gert presented their version of an 
appropriate moral theory for bioethics. Since their work appeared after Principles had 
gained quite a bit of acceptance, they framed their theory as an alternative to principle-
based frameworks. In a number of articles that appeared during the late 1980s and early 
1990s, Clouser and Gert argued that Beauchamp and Childress’s four principle schema, 
which they termed “principlism”, constitutes a completely inadequate moral framework.105 
One of the most severe criticisms they offered was that the four principle system “fails to 
provide a theory of justification or any kind of moral theory that systematically unifies the 
principles and situates them in a tidy and integrated theory that can handle conflict among 
principles.”106 After rejecting principlism, Clouser and Gert offered impartial rule theory as 
an alternative approach for bioethics.  
Clouser and Gert’s alternative to principlism is based on their conception of a 
common morality. Common morality, Clouser explains, is often expressed in terms of moral 
rules such as, do not kill or do not steal, and moral ideals like, help those in need or 
promote justice.107 When considered by themselves, these rules and ideals are just the 
recognizable maximums of morality and simply knowing these rules does not aid one in 
resolving the confusions and contradictions associated with morality in practice.  In order 
to resolve such ambiguities, Clouser and Gert maintain that it is necessary to refer to ethical 
theory.  To them, the role of theory is to “find the underlying logic” behind the existing 
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common morality.108  In addition, they claim that moral theory should show that morality is 
a “system that impartial, rational persons would find acceptable as a public system that 
applies to everyone.”109  Hence, Clouser and Gert hold that there is a common morality 
which is governed by certain impartial moral rules and moral ideals. Beauchamp and 
Childress have called this approach impartial rule theory.110  
 When there is a proposed exception to a moral rule, Clouser and Gert offer 
something akin to John Rawls’s veil of ignorance to resolve this dilemma. Since morality is a 
public system, they assert, “a violation of a moral rule is allowed only if a rational, impartial 
person could publicly allow it.”111  Clouser and Gert advocate a similar procedure for when 
moral rules and moral ideals conflict. First, one must analyze the situation and determine 
the morally relevant features. Then, when looking for a solution one is meant to use the 
same Rawlsian logic that applies to supposed exceptions to moral rules.  For Clouser and 
Gert, their formulation of a common morality that is rooted in impartial rules is much 
better than principlism at resolving ethical dilemmas because it considers the situation 
from a much more inclusive point of view.112  
Like other grand ethical theories, Clouser and Gert’s impartial rule theory is plagued 
by its broadness. For example, the idea that exceptions to moral rules are only allowed 
when “a rational, impartial person could allow it” nicely articulates the notion that morality 
should apply to all people in the same way.113  However, determining one’s proposed 
course of action based on how a “rational, impartial person” would respond to said action is 
not all that straightforward in practice.114  In addition, Beauchamp and Childress claim that 
Clouser and Gert’s general rules are not specific enough to be helpful in a complex, real-life 
situation.115  In terms of addressing practical ethical issues, Clouser and Gert’s impartial 
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rule theory suffers from many of the same limitations as the bioethics theories that 
preceded it.  
Another effort to provide an alternative to principlism came from Albert Jonsen and 
Stephen Toulmin in the form of casuistry. In the late 1980s Jonsen and Toulmin sought to 
revive casuistry as an acceptable approach to moral decision making.  According to Jonsen, 
while he and Toulmin were working for the National Commission for the Protection of 
Human Subjects they noticed that the task of defining the principles that governed the 
ethical treatment of human subjects was done after the Commission had offered 
recommendations based on a number of specific cases.116 Using this experience as 
inspiration, Jonsen and Toulmin chose to investigate the history of casuistry and sought to 
explore if it could serve as an acceptable means to analyze bioethics cases.117 In their book, 
The Abuse of Casuistry, Jonsen and Toulmin argue that “historical casuistry represented a 
sound way of thinking about moral problems and that its evil reputation arose from an 
abuse of its methods.”118 Through their comprehensive study and analysis, Jonsen and 
Toulmin played a major role in reviving interest in casuistry as an acceptable method of 
resolving moral problems. Their quest to restore faith in casuistry was so successful that 
their approach is commonly seen as a major methodological competitor to principlism.  
Jonsen and Toulmin’s casuistry has a number of interesting features. For one, their 
approach is an inductive method of moral reasoning.  Inductive approaches start at the 
case level and then work back to principles and theories. This method is one of the most 
well-defined alternatives to deductive moral reasoning. Deductivism, which has been the 
primer model among moral philosophers for centuries, relies on referring to a sufficiently 
well-defined theoretical structure in order to deduce the appropriate course of action in a 
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given situation.119  In forming their articulation of casuistry Jonsen and Toulmin completely 
reject deductivism on the grounds that it fails to capture that nature of moral reasoning 
and that no deductivist theory can capture all moral ideals.120  
In practice, casuistry begins with arguably straight-forward paradigm cases.  These 
cases are supposed to be so clear cut that it is obvious which norm indicates the right 
course of action.121  For instance, suppose a man is beating his child, without any justifiable 
cause. Upon observing this scene, any “morally serious person” would conclude that the 
father’s action is wrong.122  From this case, and others similar cases, it follows that ‘violence 
against the innocent is wrong’.123 Hence, without referring to any broad philosophical 
theory or principle this case has enabled the generation of an action guide for moral 
judgment. Once these moral inferences have been made from paradigm cases, they can be 
used to “illuminate other cases using argument by analogy.”124 Of all the proposed 
methodologies for bioethics, casuistry is perhaps the one that is most deeply connected to 
the study of concrete ethical cases. Given that bioethics began as a discourse focused on 
interesting ethical dilemmas, it is not surprising that such a case-based approach to moral 
reasoning has become popular during the last two decades.     
As previously noted, many bioethicists see casuistry as a major competitor for the 
methodological spotlight that principlism has enjoyed.  Interestingly, Beauchamp sees 
principlism and casuistry as compatible moral frameworks. “As I understand him”, 
Beauchamp explains, “Jonsen does not dismiss principles, but he does downgrade them in 
importance because he thinks moral reasoning starts at a different point.”125  Jonsen seems 
to agree with Beauchamp’s analysis. In his essay “Casuistry: An Alternative or Complement 
to Principles” he says:  
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It should be clear that this casuist…considers casuistry to be complementary to 
principles. The task of working out exactly what the complement is belongs to moral 
philosophy (and moral philosophers have been working on it for centuries).126   
To Beauchamp, the major difference between principlism and casuistry is the flow of moral 
reasoning. Casuistry begins with the paradigm case and then specifies moral rules and 
maxims, which can then be used in more difficult situations. According to Beauchamp, the 
casuist’s commitment to the specification of rules and maxims is consistence with his and 
Childress’ method specifying principles to meet the demands of specific cases.127  
Therefore, when it comes to dealing with the practical ethical cases that are so important to 
bioethics, Beauchamp maintains that casuistry and principlism are fundamentally 
connected methods of moral analysis.128   
 
Popular From the Outset    
Unlike other contemporary works, Principles quickly became popular among 
bioethicists. Not long after its publication, the first edition of the Principles became “the 
authoritative text” and “the core of the cannon” that outlined how academic ethics should 
be applied to medial practice.”129  Reviews of the book often began with statements like 
“the Beauchamp-Childress volume significantly breaks new ground as a ‘systematic 
analysis’ of the moral principles that should apply to biomedicine.”130  In addition, by the 
time the third edition of the book was published, many were already commenting on the 
influence that Principles had on bioethics. For instance, when discussing the third edition of 
Principles, physician Jonathan R. Sande states, “if it is the case that biomedical ethics has 
emerged as a new discipline and that a discipline so young can have an authoritative text, 
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Principles of Biomedical Ethics might be that text.”131  The fact that, shortly after their 
introduction, the four principles began to permeate writings on medical ethics further 
demonstrates their influence.132  
The reasons why Principles gained such immediate popularity and why it became 
the authoritative book for bioethics are rarely discussed in most histories of the field. Most 
commentators indicate that the book was extremely important and highly influential, but 
quickly move on to describe its content and the positives and negatives of its approach. So 
much emphasis has been placed on the content of the book and the philosophical 
implications of its principles that the question of why it had such an impact has been 
largely ignored.  
The failure of the theories proposed by Veatch, Engelhardt, and Pellegrino and 
Thomasma to reach the canonical level of Principles provides some valuable insight. Part of 
the reason that Principles succeeded where other texts failed is because, as Beauchamp 
points out, the four principles were never meant to be a full-fledged moral system or 
theory.133  Moreover, Veatch, Engelhardt, and Pellegrino and Thomasa all presented some 
form of the principles of autonomy and beneficence in their works. This suggests that the 
content of these works was not all that different than that of Principles. The major 
difference between Beauchamp and Childress’s approach and work of the others is that 
their system does not require commitment to a single theory.  Thus, acceptance of their 
framework did not hinge on the consistency of an overarching theory. Since Veatch, 
Engelhardt, and Pellegrino and Thomasa all presented general theories, acceptance of their 
theories was in part dependent on their consistency and correctness. By avoiding making 
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such a difficult theoretical commitment, Beauchamp and Childress’s approach was able to 
gain popularity over the competing theories of other bioethicists.  
The primary validation of Beauchamp and Childress’s framework is the applicability 
of their four principles to actual bioethics cases. However, they also offer a secondary 
justification for the validity of their approach. According to Beauchamp and Childress, not 
only is it possible to analyze cases without an overarching bioethics theory, there does not 
even need to be agreement about which philosophical theory justifies each principle. As we 
have seen, they justify this assertion using their own philosophical backgrounds of rule 
utilitarianism and rule deontology as evidence. Thus, when using the four principles, 
bioethicists did not have to commit to a single bioethics theory or agree with Beauchamp 
and Childress concerning how they justified their principles. None of the other 
contemporary works could provide early bioethicists with such intellectual flexibility.    
Another reason Principles was able to have such a lasting influence is because it is 
what Childress calls a “work in transition.”134  Such “works in transition” are written with 
“an implicit understanding that new empirical developments will likely require that 
concepts be adjusted, refined, or further elucidated.”135 According to Walter and Klein, 
bioethics has been a field built on these works in transition and this is best exemplified by 
Principles.136  As Walter and Klein argue, although few bioethicists have read all six editions 
of Principles, and may not be completely aware of all the revisions that this work has 
undergone, “nearly everyone versed in the field has read or been influenced by his 
work.”137 Thus, one of the reasons Principles has become so influential is because it has 
been revised several times, with all of the revisions taking place as bioethics was forming 
and evolving.  Beauchamp and Childress, therefore, had the unique opportunity to rework 
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their approach as bioethics grew and changed. This enabled them to take into account the 
needs of bioethics as it matured. With each new edition, Beauchamp and Childress were 
able to both refine their approach and address new concerns as they arose.     
 An interesting aspect of Beauchamp and Childress’s continuous revision of 
Principles is the way in which they tend to address criticism. Like many academics, 
Beauchamp and Childress spend a great deal of time defending their framework from 
pointed scholarly attacks. However, these two bioethicists have an uncanny ability to take 
the criticism directed at their approach and rework it in such a way that it can actually be 
incorporated into the next edition of Principles. Bioethicist J.D. Arras uses a rather clever 
analogy to describe this state of affairs. He compares Principles to the Borg from the 
popular science-fiction series Star Trek, The Next Generation. To Arras, the way these 
“cybernetically-enhanced humanoid drones” travel around the universe in search of new 
interesting cultures and technologies to assimilate bears a striking resemblance to the way 
in which Principles absorbs all the criticisms that come its way.138 Arras describes this 
absorptive process quite nicely: 
No sooner do they [critics] launch a seemingly crippling broadside against the 
juggernaut of PBE from a casuist, narrativist, feminist, or pragmatist perspective 
than their critique is promptly welcomed with open arms, trimmed of its perceived 
excesses, and incorporated into the ever-expanding synthesis of the next edition.139 
Beauchamp and Childress’s ability to absorb criticism, while annoying to their opponents, 
further highlights their commitment to making principlism suitable for a field that is 
constantly evolving.  
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 In addition to finding acceptance among bioethicists, Principles also became popular 
in medical practice. According to bioethicist Arthur Caplan, the book delivered a “much 
needed attempt to provide the theoretical framework within which and from which 
normative assessments and evaluations of clinical behavior in the health professions can be 
made.”140  Caplan also indicates that the book attempted to “fill a gaping hole in the 
teaching materials of the field.”141   Before Principles was introduced, the usual approach to 
tackling ethical problems in medicine was a case-based method which considered ethical 
problems in a specific instance and then attempted to derive rules based on that case that 
could be applied to similar situations.  With the four principles, however, physicians could 
look at individual cases and use the principles as action guides.  Each case could be 
examined using the same principles, instead of using less rigorously justified rules derived 
from other cases. Apparently, principlism permeated the medical establishment to such an 
extent that “invoking the four principles to address medical ethical dilemmas became the 
standard approach heard on hospital rounds, read in prestigious medical journals, and 
found in policy reports.”142  Thus, Principles served the dual purpose of providing an 
applicable structure for analyzing ethical dilemmas in medicine and becoming a useful 
textbook for biomedical ethics. 
 
Criticizing the Cannon 
Even though Principles is often considered the cannon of bioethics, the text was also 
heavily criticized. One common criticism of principlism is that it largely excludes theology 
and religion.143   Some see morality and moral philosophy as linked to theology and feel 
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that Principles is incomplete without such considerations. Caplan also criticized the book 
for omitting “the social and historical context in which western morality evolved and is 
now practiced.”144  Given that the intended audience is healthcare professionals, Caplan 
argues, such considerations should have been included.145   He also points out that the book 
failed to “give any context for ethics itself.”146  Since the health care professionals that the 
book targets may not have any philosophical background, they would probably want to 
know how moral considerations should be weighed against other concerns such as, 
economic repercussions, political agendas, and cultural values.147  
Besides being criticized for a number of omissions, the book is also faulted for trying 
to do too much in a single volume. For instance, Caplan claims that attempting “to present 
the key tenets of moral theory, the methods for the adjudication of moral disputes, an 
introduction to the nature of clinical medical practice, and the application of moral 
principles to the analysis of valuational dilemmas in medicine all in the confines of a single 
book” constitutes an almost impossible endeavor.148  This type of seemingly contradictory 
criticism is common in discussions and reviews of Principles. 
Another criticism commonly directed at Principles is that it places too much stress 
on philosophical theory. For example, Sande claims that the “intentional theoretical 
orientation of this text” is “distressingly distant from the lived moral lives of patients and 
health-care professionals.”149  Not only does Sande assert that the theoretical focus of the 
text hinders its practical effectiveness, he also points out that “the philosophical prose and 
thick argumentation in the text, may make it difficult to use at an undergraduate level or in 
schools for health-care professionals, where time devoted to ethics is often minimal.”150 
Caplan seems to agree with Sande. He claims that “health professionals and students in the 
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health professions may find the book too technical and jargon-ridden to be easily 
accessible.”151  Caplan furthers his point by asserting that “most persons in the health care 
professions will probably not have the time and the patience necessary to work through all 
the intricacies and details of moral theory that the book contains, despite the presence of 
occasional allusions to clinical practice.”152  Despite Beauchamp and Childress’s effort to 
create a text that provides both a thorough introduction to moral theory and principles that 
can be used in clinical cases, such an endeavor may be too theoretical for an audience of 
health-care professionals. 
While some argue that the approach presented in Principles is too complex, others 
call it too simplistic.  For example, Caplan claims that the way Beauchamp and Childress 
depict ethics as “being a subject characterized by a structure of hierarchically arranged 
judgments, rules, principles and theories” gives a false impression of simple transitions 
between these levels.153  He goes on to assert that this structure may be neat in theory but 
this type of linearity “is rarely seen in practice, in medicine or anywhere else.”154  In 
addition, some bioethicists consider the deductive application of principles to cases in the 
book to be much too simplistic. Although this would probably not be an issue for health 
care professionals, bioethicists often found portions of the approach delineated in 
Principles to be too simplistic to capture the inherent complexity of real bioethics cases.  
While some consider simplicity a flaw, others interpret it as an important aspect of 
principlism.  For instance, Emanuel suggests that principlism is appealing because of its 
simplicity. He claims that by knowing a small number of principles, nonethicists had a 
checklist of sorts, which would aid them in confronting the difficult ethical problems they 
encountered in their professions.155  The ability of principlism to be simplified for 
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nonethicists makes it possible for a physician to use the four principles to guide his or her 
decision-making when facing an ethical dilemma. In fact, Beauchamp and Childress make it 
particularly easy to use their book in this manner by demonstrating how the four principles 
can be used in specific cases. According to Emanuel, the way that Beauchamp and Childress 
“ ‘explore the content and conflicts’ of the principles in specific cases” is “the essence” and 
“the greatest virtue of the book” because they show the “ethical analysis of particular cases 
in action.”156  He furthers his point by claiming that, “whether one is a trained ethicist or a 
health professional or a layperson looking at a particular dilemma, Beauchamp and 
Childress provide a rich analysis that elucidates its complexities and offers original 
perspectives and insightful comments.”157 Hence, while many bioethicists consider 
principlism to be too simplistic, it is this simplicity that makes the approach useful to 
professionals looking for guidance in making difficult decisions.  
As has been shown, despite its appeal, many scholars raised valid criticisms about 
principlism. However, some of these critiques are specific to the intended user. For 
instance, Caplan deemed the book too simplistic in its treatment of the hierarchical 
structure of ethics, yet too complex for practical use by healthcare professionals.  Since 
Principles is meant to be used by two very different groups, namely bioethicists and 
healthcare professionals, if the aspects of the book that are unappealing to one group were 
completely addressed, then the book would become even more dissatisfying to the other 
group. In order for Principles to be a satisfactory text for both bioethicists and health-care 
professionals, it needed to find a careful balance between the theoretical and the practical. 
This is exactly what Beauchamp and Childress tried to do as they revised their work. They 
continued to rework the philosophical aspects of their framework as bioethicists continued 
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to criticize it. At the same time, Beauchamp and Childress tried to keep their approach 
practical enough for it to be useful to health care professionals. Even though bioethicists 
found flaws in the ethical framework delineated in Principles, they still use it when dealing 
with ethics cases.  
 
Criticized But Still Popular   
Besides an accepted theory or framework, a field also requires a methodology. 
According to Jonsen, a developing field needs a method that enables “its practitioners to 
order their materials in recognizable ways, to evaluate the relevance of various bits of that 
material, and to analyze the relationships between those bits.”158 From its beginnings, 
bioethics was looking for an adequate methodology for applying ethics in a way that is 
useful in real-life cases. Beauchamp and Childress gave bioethics its first recognizable 
methodology.  By demonstrating how their abstract framework of principles could be 
applied in ethical dilemmas, Beauchamp and Childress gave bioethicists and professionals 
an organized means to “identify and reflect on moral problems.”159  Hence, one of the most 
important aspects of the four principles is the role they played in giving the way in which 
bioethicists deal with issues a recognizable structure.   
The method that stemmed from Principles, namely, identifying, balancing, and 
specifying principles when dealing with difficult ethics case, became so popular that the 
four principles became the recognizable feature of bioethics. In addition, not only were the 
four principles quickly adopted in medicine, but since bioethics is also concerned with 
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controversial issues like abortion, the right to die, and human stem cell research, they also 
began to appear in public discourse.  
The lengthy legal battle and highly publicized controversy that surrounded the Terri 
Schiavo case serves as an illustrative example.  In the Schiavo case, which lasted from1998 
to 2005, the public was exposed to a real life ethical dilemma where principles were in 
conflict. Some of the conflicting principles can be seen from the basic detail of this case. 
Since Schiavo was declared to be in a persistent vegetative state she had lost the capacity to 
make autonomous choices concerning her treatment. This led to a conflict between her 
husband, advocating for her removal from life support, and her parents, who were fighting 
to keep their daughter on the life sustaining machines. The conflict between both parties 
brought up questions of who had the right to decide Schiavo’s fate for her. In addition, this 
dilemma put the doctors in the difficult position of being asked to remove a life-sustaining 
device, which would violate the principle of nonmaleficence. Intricate discussion of this 
case would require much more attention than can be given here, but the few principles that 
have been shown to conflict in this case exemplify the way this approach found its way into 
public discourse.  
Another way principlism shaped bioethics was by enabling it to move into the 
classroom. Once bioethics had a recognizable methodology, it could be taught to those 
outside the field. The first place bioethics was taught was in medical schools. This is not 
surprising given that physicians often grapple with ethical dilemmas on a daily basis. After 
bioethics infiltrated medical schools, graduate programs began to appear in the mid-1970s, 
with the first one being established at University of Tennessee in 1974.160  Professional 
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programs that targeted doctors, nurses, and educators were also set up during this 
period.161  
The opportunity to teach bioethics helped to further refine the field’s methodology. 
According to Jonsen, by preparing courses and syllabi, bioethicists were forced to define 
abstract concepts, to order issues in a meaningful way, to fit discussions into a logical form, 
and to push for answers to previously unanswered questions.162  This task pushed 
bioethicists to engage with their own methods and to present them in such a way that 
made sense to those outside the field. Although Principles certainly was not the only text 
bioethicists used to organize their field’s tools and methods, it certainly gave bioethicists a 
framework for how to go about this process since Beauchamp and Childress had to engage 
in the same task when they wrote and revised their book.  
Even after an explosion of literature had been published, bioethics centers had been 
created, and universities began offering courses, bioethicists continued to feel that their 
field was suffering from major methodological problems. While Principles certainly 
provided the first widely accepted method for balancing theory and practice, bioethicists 
began to seriously question its effectiveness during the mid-1980s and 1990s.  Many 
bioethicists felt that despite the constant revision of the book, it still did not solve the 
problem of how to balance theory and practice in bioethics. Even as late as 1990, 
bioethicists felt that this was a major issue for the field. In a review of Principles published 
in 1990, Jonsen admits that the relationship between theory and practice is still a vexing 
issue for bioethics.163  Thus, even though Principles gave bioethics a methodological 
approach that could be applied in real-life situations, it was still considered to be imperfect. 
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Conclusion 
 Principles has shaped bioethics in a number of important ways.  As we have seen 
throughout this analysis, it gave the field some much needed structure, it enabled bioethics 
to be better taught in medical schools and universities, and it gave bioethics a recognizable 
mantra in the form of the four principles. Principles’ popularity and perceived importance 
had some surprising implications as well.  For instance, according to bioethicist Jonathan 
Moreno, Principles has been such a profitable book for Oxford University Press that it has 
supported the publication of all their other bioethics titles.164  What can be gleaned from 
the book’s combined profitability and popularity is that there is a perceived need for this 
kind of work.  That is, the bioethics community has found Principles to be extremely 
important, both as a volume to be studied for its own sake and as an impetus for further 
development. Furthermore, it is evident that the book’s success has motivated Oxford 
University Press to continue to support the growth and evolution of the field by continuing 
to publish bioethics texts.  Hence, Principles served as a make-shift foundation that gave 
bioethics the organization it needed in order to further its development.  
The effect Principles had on bioethics can be seen most clearly when considered in 
terms of a Kuhnian paradigm shift. As twentieth century scientific historian Thomas Kuhn 
articulated in his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, science does not move 
forward in a strictly linear fashion. Instead, its progress can be seen as a series of drastic 
upheavals, which he called paradigm shifts. While bioethics certainly is not a science, the 
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concept of paradigm shift helps clarify the initial impact Principles had and also provides an 
explanation for its current stature in bioethics.  
Even though the term paradigm is commonly used when analyzing the evolution of 
fields and disciplines, its definition is vague enough to warrant some attention. In The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn used it to refer to “accepted examples of scientific 
practice” such as, laws, applications, and theories, “from which spring particular coherent 
traditions of scientific research” at a particular time.165   While Kuhn’s original formulation 
of paradigm was directed strictly at accepted practices in scientific fields, the term is 
conceived more broadly in some scholarly circles.  For the purposes of this essay the term 
paradigm is defined broadly as a philosophical or theoretical framework that defines the 
general thought pattern or methodology of a particular field or discipline.   
 As has been previously discussed, the principle approach emerged when creating an 
appropriate methodology was a chief concern for bioethicists. Furthermore, many early 
bioethicists found the theories that preceded principlism to be largely unsatisfactory. 
Hence, Principles appeared at an opportune point in bioethics’ history.  Bioethicists wanted 
a method that did not consist of merely applying broad philosophical theories to ethical 
problems and that is precisely what Beauchamp and Childress delivered.   In the sense that 
the principle approach fulfilled the needs of bioethics during a crucial formative stage 
between the 1970s and 1980s, it became bioethics’ first paradigm.  
During the 1970s and 1980s, many bioethicists were content with principlism.  The 
approach certainty had its critics, but by and large it was widely accepted within the 
bioethics community.  According to Beauchamp, principles served as an anchor for the 
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young bioethics and “contributed a sense that the field rests on something firmer than 
disciplinary bias or subjective judgment.”166 As bioethics continued to grow, using 
principlism as a paradigm no longer seemed appropriate.  By the mid-1980s, “the adequacy 
and sufficiency of frameworks of general principles” was being called into question.167 Once 
the acceptability of principle-based frameworks was being seriously challenged on a large 
enough scale, it ceased to be an acceptable paradigm for bioethics. Thus, the mid 1980s 
marks the beginning of a paradigm shift for bioethics.   
As with any paradigm shift there are those who still champion the old paradigm and 
those who are so dissatisfied with it that they choose to search for a completely new 
methodology. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Beauchamp and Childress remain committed to 
their theoretical framework.  In recognition of all the criticism it has received, however, 
they have continually revised it over the last three decades and have made a Herculean 
effort to address said criticism in the actual text of Principles. Other bioethicists such as,  
Danner Clouser and Bernard Gert, are extremely dissatisfied with principle-based systems 
and have sought to identify general ethical theories that do a better job of illuminating 
moral reasoning in practice. Since there is again widespread disagreement concerning how 
to balance theory and practice, bioethics is currently in a state of methodological upheaval. 
With the revival of concern about the lack of unity within bioethics, the field is again 
searching for an appropriate framework.     
While the methodology delineated in Principles is no longer bioethics’ central 
paradigm, the prominent place it continues to hold in bioethics has enabled the transition 
to what Kuhn called normal science.  Kuhn defined normal science as, “research firmly 
based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular 
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scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further 
practice.”168  Admittedly, relating the effort to define a better methodology for bioethics to 
scientific research is a bit incongruous. However, Kuhn’s concept of continuous intellectual 
effort based on a foundation that is only accepted for a certain time is relevant here. Before 
Beauchamp and Childress introduced Principles, bioethics was disorganized and lacked a 
unifying methodology. After the four-principle approach was introduced and gained 
acceptance it became the chief paradigm for bioethics. This brief period is similar to normal 
science because it was a time when many bioethicists were content to work within the 
system of principlism. As an increasing number of bioethicists became skeptical of the 
appropriateness of principlism, some choose to reevaluate this framework in an effort to 
make it stronger, while others abandoned it entirely. Hence, bioethics is currently looking 
to enter that stage of “normal science” again since there is still a perceived need to find an 
appropriate unifying framework.  
Having an accepted paradigm is one of the central criteria for forming a field of inquiry.  
By becoming its first paradigm, Principles has invariably aided bioethics in becoming the 
recognizable academic field that it is today.  As Jonsen stated in a review of Principles, after 
beginning as a nebulous discourse, without any unifying theories, tenets, and methods, 
what bioethics truly needed to move forward was a book that could link the currently 
interesting questions of biomedicine to the currently accepted approaches of moral 
philosophy.169   Principles did this. Through their book, Beauchamp and Childress provided 
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The reason that Principles of Biomedical Ethics is considered the cannon of bioethics 
is because it provided the first workable approach that linked moral philosophy to the 
important issues in biomedicine, while creating a single system that could be used in actual 
cases.  As shown by the vast number of critiques, bioethicists did not, and still do not, 
completely agree with the practicality or the philosophical soundness of some of the ideas 
Beauchamp and Childress present.  However, whether or not a framework of mid-level 
principles is the one, correct approach to bioethics is not what makes this book so 
influential. One of the major reasons that it is given such a prominent place in the history of 
bioethics is that by being a functional, if imperfect, methodology it helped facilitate the 
formation of academic departments, bioethics centers, research programs, and 
undergraduate courses, all of the aspects necessary to become a recognized field. Stated 
more simply, principlism enabled bioethics to move forward. This would have been 
impossible with the disorganized structure that defined the first two decades of bioethics. 
Although bioethicists are far from agreeing on one methodology, there is no doubt that The 
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